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Abstract With the emergence of 5G low latency appli-
cations, such as haptics and V2X, low complexity and
low latency security mechanisms are needed. Promis-
ing lightweight mechanisms include physical unclonable
functions (PUF) and secret key generation (SKG) at the
physical layer, as considered in this paper. In this frame-
work we propose i) a zero-round-trip-time (0-RTT) re-
sumption authentication protocol combining PUF and
SKG processes; ii) a novel authenticated encryption (AE)
using SKG; iii) pipelining of the AE SKG and the en-
crypted data transfer in order to reduce latency. Imple-
menting the pipelining at PHY, we investigate a parallel
SKG approach for multi-carrier systems, where a sub-
set of the subcarriers are used for SKG and the rest for
data transmission. The optimal solution to this PHY
resource allocation problem is identified under security,
power and delay constraints, by formulating the sub-
carrier scheduling as a subset-sum 0 − 1 knapsack op-
timization. A heuristic algorithm of linear complexity
is proposed and shown to incur negligible loss with re-
spect to the optimal dynamic programming solution.
All of the proposed mechanisms, have the potential to
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pave the way for a new breed of latency aware security
protocols.
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1 Introduction
Many standard cryptographic schemes, particularly tho-
se in the realm of public key encryption (PKE), are com-
putationally intensive, incurring considerable overheads
and can rapidly drain the battery of power constrained
devices [1], [2], notably in Internet of things (IoT) appli-
cations [3]. For example, a 3GPP report on the security
of ultra reliable low latency communication (URLLC)
systems notes that authentication for URLLC is still an
open problem [4]. Additionally, traditional public key
generation schemes are not quantum secure – in that
when sufficiently capable quantum computers will be
available they will be able to break current known PKE
schemes – unless the key sizes increase to impractical
lengths.
In the past years, physical layer security (PLS) [5–9]
has been studied as a possible alternative to classic,
complexity based, cryptography. As an example, signal
properties as in [10], can be exploited to generate op-
portunities for confidential data transmission [11, 12].
Notably, PLS is explicitly mentioned as a 6G enabling
technology in the first white paper on 6G [13]: “The
strongest security protection may be achieved at the
physical layer.” In this work, we propose to move some
of the security core functions down to the physical layer,
exploiting both the communication radio channel and
the hardware, as unique entropy sources.
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Since the wireless channel is reciprocal, time-variant
and random in nature, it offers a valid, inherently secure
source that may be used in a key agreement protocol
between two communicating parties. The principle of
secret key generation (SKG) from correlated observa-
tions was first studied in [14] and [15]. A straightfor-
ward SKG approach can be built by exploiting the reci-
procity of the wireless fading coefficients between two
terminals within the channel coherence time [16] and
this paper builds upon this mechanism. This is perti-
nent to many forthcoming B5G applications that will
require a strong, but nevertheless, lightweight security
key agreement; in this direction, PLS may offer such a
solution, or, complement existing algorithms. With re-
spect to authentication, physical unclonable functions
(PUFs), firstly introduced in [17] (based on the idea
of physical one-way functions [18]), [19] could also en-
hance authentication and key agreement in demanding
scenarios, including (but not limited to) device to de-
vice and tactile Internet. We note that others also point
to using physical layer security to reduce the resource
overhead in URLLC [20].
A further advantage of PLS is that it is information-
theoretic secure [21], i.e., it is not open to attack by
future quantum computers, and, it requires lower com-
putation costs as will be explored later in this paper.
In this work, we will discuss how SKG from shared
randomness [22] is a promising alternative to PKE for
key agreement. However, unauthenticated key genera-
tion is vulnerable to man in the middle (MiM) attacks.
In this sense, PUFs, can be used in conjunction with
SKG to provide authenticated encryption (AE). As
summarised in [19] the employment of PUFs can de-
crease the computational cost and have a high impact
on reducing the authentication latency in constrained
devices.
In this study we introduce the joint use of PUF
authentication and SKG in a zero-round-trip-time (0-
RTT) [23,24] approach, allowing to build quick authen-
tication mechanisms with forward security. Further, we
develop an AE primitive [25–27] based on standard SKG
schemes. To investigate a fast implementation of the
AE SKG we propose a pipelined (parallel) scheduling
method for optimal resource allocation at the physical
layer (PHY) (i.e., by optimal allocation of the subcar-
riers in 5G resource blocks).
Next, we extend the analysis to account for statis-
tical delay quality of service (QoS) guarantees, a per-
tinent scenario in B5G. The support of different QoS
guarantee levels is a challenging task. In fact, in time-
varying channels, such as in wireless networks, deter-
mining the exact delay-bound depending on the users’
requirements, is impossible. However, a practical ap-
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Fig. 1 Roadmap of contributions.
proach, namely the effective capacity [28], can provide
statistical QoS guarantees, and, can give delay-bounds
with a small violation probability. In our work, we em-
ploy the effective capacity as the metric of interest and
investigate how the proposed pipelined AE SKG scheme
performs in a delay-constrained scenario.
The system model introduced in this work assumes
that a block fading additive white Gaussian noise (BF-
AWGN) channel is used with multiple orthogonal sub-
carriers. In our parallel scheme a subset of the subcar-
riers is used for SKG and the rest for encrypted data
transfer. The findings of this paper are supported by nu-
merical results, and the efficiency of the proposed par-
allel scheme is shown to be greater or similar to the
efficiency of an alternative approach in which SKG and
encrypted data transfer are sequentially performed.
The contributions of this paper are as follows:
1. We combine an initial PUF authentication and SKG
for resumption key derivation in a single 0-RTT pro-
tocol.
2. We develop an AE SKG scheme.
3. We propose a fast implementation of the AE SKG
based on pipelining of key generation and encrypted
data transfer. This parallel approach is achieved by
allocation of the PHY resources, i.e., by optimal
scheduling of the subcarriers in BF-AWGN chan-
nels.
4. We propose a heuristic algorithm of linear complex-
ity that finds the optimal subcarrier allocation with
negligible loss in terms of efficiency.
5. We numerically compare the efficiency of our paral-
lel approach with a sequential approach where SKG
and data transfer are performed sequentially. This
comparison is performed in two delay scenarios:
– When a relaxed QoS delay constraint is in place;
– When a stringent QoS delay constraint is in place.
A roadmap of the paper’s contributions is shown in Fig.
1.
The paper is organized as follows: related work is
discussed in Section 2 followed by a brief summary of
the methods used within this paper in Section 3 and
then the general system model is introduced in Sec-
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tion 4. The use of PUF authentication is illustrated in
Section 4.1, the baseline SKG in Section 4.2; next, in
Sections 4.3 and 4.4 we present an AE scheme using
SKG and a resumption scheme to build a 0-RTT pro-
tocol. Subsequently, we evaluate the optimal power and
subcarrier allocation at PHY considering both the long
term average rate in Section 5 and the effective rate in
Section 6. In Section 7, the efficiency of the proposed
approach is evaluated against that of a sequential ap-
proach, while conclusions are presented in Section 8.
2 Related Work
This paper assumes the use of PUF-based authentica-
tion with SKG. PUFs are hardware entities based on
the physically unclonable variations that occur during
the production process of silicon. These unique and un-
predictable variations allow the extraction of uniformly
distributed binary sequences. Due to their unclonabil-
ity and simplicity, PUFs are seen as lightweight security
primitives that can offer alternatives to today’s authen-
tication mechanisms. Furthermore, employing PUFs can
eliminate the need of non-volatile memory, which re-
duces cost and complexity [29]. Common ways of ex-
tracting secret bit sequences are through measuring de-
lays on wires and gates or observing the power up be-
havior of a silicon.
Focusing on that, numerous PUF architectures have
been proposed for IoT applications in the literature. A
few of these architectures are: arbiter PUF [30], ring os-
cillator PUF [17], transient effect ring oscillator PUF [31],
static random-access memory PUF [32], hardware em-
bedded delay PUF [33] and more [34]. Utilising these
basic properties, many PUF-based authentication pro-
tocols have been proposed, both for unilateral authen-
tication [35, 36] and mutual authentication [29, 36–38].
A comprehensive survey on lightweight PUF authenti-
cation schemes is presented by Delvaux et al. [39].
On the other hand, due to the nature of propagation
in a shared free-space, wireless communication remains
vulnerable to different types of attacks. Passive attacks
such as eavesdropping or traffic analysis can be per-
formed by anyone in the vicinity of the communicating
parties; to ensure confidentiality data encryption is vi-
tal for communication security. The required keys can
be agreed at PHY using SKG. In this case, all pilot
exchanges need to take place over the coherence time
of the channel1, during which Alice and Bob can ob-
1 The coherence time corresponds to the interval during
which the multipath properties of wireless channels (chan-
nel gains, signal phase, delay) remain stable [40–42]. It is
inversely proportional to the Doppler spread, which on the
other hand, is a dispersion metric that accounts for the spec-
serve highly correlated channel states that can be used
to generate a shared secret key between them. SKG
has been implemented and studied for different appli-
cations such as vehicular communications [42, 43], un-
derwater communications [44], optical fiber [45], visi-
ble light communication [46] and more as summarized
in [47]. The key conclusion from these studies is that
SKG shows promise as an important alternative to cur-
rent key agreement schemes.
Widely used sources of shared randomness used for
SKG are the received signal strength (RSS) and the
full channel state information (CSI) [48]. In either case,
it is important to build a suitable pre-processing unit
to decorrelate the signals in the time / frequency and
space domains. As an example, some recent works have
shown that the widely adopted assumption [49] that
a distance equal to half of the wavelength (which at
2.4 GHz is approximately 6 cm [50]) is enough for two
channels to decorrelate, may not hold in reality [40].
Other works show that the mobility can highly increase
the entropy of the generated key [51, 52] while an im-
portant issue with the RSS-based schemes is that they
are open to predictable channel attacks [40, 53]. These
important issues need to be explicitly accounted for in
actual implementations, but fall outside the scope of
this paper.
3 Methods
The methods used and introduced in this paper rely
upon a range of basic primitives, which, in combination
provide the full PUF and AE SKG solution. Each of
these primitives is introduced below together with a
summary of the methods used to analyse and optimise
the solution.
Authentication: Before establishing a shared secret key,
Alice and Bob must be sure they are communicat-
ing with a trusted party. To achieve this we assume
the usage of a PLS method, more specifically PUF
authentication. As discussed in Section 2 by elimi-
nating the need of non-volatile memory the usage of
PUFs could greatly reduce the complexity compared
to existing authentication alternatives.
Secret key generation: To ensure that their communi-
cation is private, after authenticating each other Al-
ice and Bob have to encrypt / decrypt the data. For
this work we assume the use of symmetric encryp-
tion where the same key is used for both operations.
In order to obtain a shared key we propose to use
tral broadening caused by the user’s mobility (for more details
and derivation please see [41]).
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SKG which consists of three standard steps: i) ad-
vantage distillation; ii) information reconciliation;
and, iii) privacy amplification; each of these steps
is explained in more detail in Section 4.2.
Re-authentication: We present a re-authentication ap-
proach that exploits the use of resumption secrets as
used in 0-RTT protocols. Instead of performing full
authentication before sending data encrypted with
a new key, we propose a new method which allows
Alice (Bob) to authenticate subsequent keys using a
lightweight scheme anchored by the initial authen-
tication process.
Authenticated encryption SKG: To eliminate the possi-
bility of tampering attacks we build on the SKG pro-
cess to introduce a new AE SKG method. AE can si-
multaneously guarantee confidentiality and message
integrity. In our AE SKG method, side information
and encrypted data transfer are pipelined.
Pipelined transmission: In our proposal, the key gen-
eration is pipelined with the encrypted data trans-
fer, i.e., side information and data encrypted with
the key that corresponds to the side information are
transmitted over the same 5G resource block(s).
Joint PHY/MAC delay analysis : To analyze the system
under statistical QoS delay constraints we use the
theory of effective capacity [28] and analyse the sche-
me’s effective rate.
Optimization methods : Finally, to optimize the pipelined
transmission, we take into consideration practical
wireless aspects such as the impact of imperfect CSI
measurements and formulate two optimization prob-
lems to find the optimal resource allocation for Alice
and Bob. To solve these problems we employ tools
such as combinatorial optimization, dynamic pro-
gramming, order statistics and convex optimization.
3.1 Threat Model
In this paper we assume a commonly used adversarial
model with an active man-in-the-middle attacker (Eve)
and a pair of legitimate users (Alice and Bob). For sim-
plicity, we assume a rich Rayleigh multipath environ-
ment where the adversary is more than a few wave-
lengths away from each of the legitimate parties. This
forms the basis of our hypothesis that the measurements
of Alice and Bob are uncorrelated to the Eve’s measure-
ments.
Notation
Random variables are denoted in italic font, e.g., x, vec-
tors and matrices are denoted with lower and upper case
bold characters, e.g., x and X, respectively. Functions
are printed in a fixed-width teletype font, e.g., F. All
sets of vectors are given with calligraphic font X and
the elements within a set are given in curly brackets
e.g. {x,y}, the cardinality of a vector or set is defined
by vertical lines e.g., |x| or |X | . Concatenation and
bit-wise XORing are represented as [x||y] and x ⊕ y,
respectively. We use H to denote entropy, I mutual
information, E expectation and C the set of complex
numbers.
4 Node Authentication Using PUFs and SKG
In this Section we present a joint physical layer SKG
and PUF authentication scheme. To the best of our’
knowledge this is the first work that proposes the uti-
lization of the two schemes in conjunction. As discussed
in Section 2, many PUF authentication protocols have
been proposed in the literature, with even a few com-
mercially available [54, 55]. We do not look into devel-
oping a new PUF architecture or a new PUF authenti-
cation protocol, instead, we look at combining existing
PUF mechanisms with SKG. In addition, we develop
an AE scheme that can prevent tampering attacks. To
further develop our hybrid crypto-system we propose a
resumption type of authentication protocol, inspired by
the 0-RTT authentication mode in the transport layer
security (TLS) 1.3 protocol. The resumption protocol
is important as it significantly reduces the use of the
PUF to the initial authentication, thus, overcoming the
limitation of a PUFs’ challenge response space [34, 56].
4.1 Node Authentication Using PUFs
As discussed in Section 3, for security against MiM at-
tacks, the SKG needs to be protected through authenti-
cation. While existing techniques, such as the extensible
authentication protocol-transport layer security (EAP-
TLS), could be used as the authentication mechanism,
these are computationally intensive and can lead to sig-
nificant latency [57, 58].
This leads to the motivation to seek lightweight au-
thentication mechanisms that can be used in conjunc-
tion with SKG. Such a mechanism that is achieving
note within the research community uses a PUF. The
concept of a PUF was first introduced in [17], its idea
is to utilize the fact that every integrated circuit dif-
fers to others due to manufacturing variability [59, 60]
and cannot be cloned [61]. Having these characteristics
a PUF can be used in a challenge – response scheme,
where a challenge can refer to a delay at a specific gate,
power-on state, etc.
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A typical PUF-based authentication protocol con-
sists of two main phases, namely enrolment phase and
authentication phase [62–66]. During the enrolment pha-
se each node runs a set of challenges on its PUF and
characterizes the variance of the measurement noise in
order to generate side information. Next, a verifier cre-
ates and stores a database of all challenge-response pairs
(CRPs) for each node’s PUF within its network. A CRP
pair in essence consists of an authentication key and re-
lated side information. Within the database, each CRP
is associated with the ID of the corresponding node.
Later, during the authentication phase a node sends
its ID to the verifier requesting to start a communi-
cation. Receiving the request, the verifier checks if the
received ID exists in its database. If it does, the veri-
fier chooses a random challenge that corresponds to this
ID and sends it to the node. The node computes the re-
sponse by running the challenge on its PUF and sends it
to the verifier. However, the PUF measurements at the
node are never exactly the same due to measurement
noise, therefore, the verifier uses the new PUF measure-
ment and the side information stored during the enroll-
ment to re-generate the authentication key. Finally, the
verifier compares the re-generated key to the one in the
CRP and if they are identical the authentication of the
node is successful. In order to prevent replay attacks,
once used, a CRP is deleted from the verifier database.
In summary, the motivation for using a PUF authen-
tication scheme in conjunction with SKG is to exclude
all of the computationally intensive operations required
by EAP-TLS, which use modulo arithmetic in large
fields. Measurements performed on current public key
operations within EAP-TLS on common devices (such
as IoT) give average authentication and key generation
times of approximately 160 ms in static environments
and this can reach up to 336 ms in high mobility con-
ditions [67].
On the other hand, PUF authentication protocols
have very low computational overhead and require over-
all authentication times that can be less than 10 ms
[63, 68]. Furthermore, our key generation scheme, pro-
posed in Section 4.2, requires just a hashing operation
and (syndrome) decoding. Hashing mechanisms such as
SHA256 performed on an IoT device require less than
0.3ms [68, 69]. Regarding the decoding, if we assume
the usage of standard LDPC or BCH error correcting
mechanisms, even in the worst-case scenario with calcu-
lations carried out as software operations, the compu-
tation is trivial compared to the hashing and requires
less computational overhead [70].
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Fig. 2 Secret key generation between Alice and Bob.
4.2 SKG procedure
The SKG system model is shown in Fig. 2. This as-
sumes that two legitimate parties, Alice and Bob, wish
to establish a symmetric secret key using the wireless
fading coefficients as a source of shared randomness.
Throughout our work a rich Rayleigh multipath envi-
ronment is assumed, such that the fading coefficients
rapidly decorrelate over short distances [16]. Further-
more, Alice and Bob communicate over a BF-AWGN
channel that comprises N orthogonal subcarriers. The
fading coefficients h = [h1, . . . , hN ], are assumed to be
independent and identically distributed (i.i.d), complex
circularly symmetric zero-mean Gaussian random vari-
ables hj ∼ CN (0, σ2), j = 1, . . . , N . Although in actual
multicarrier systems neighbouring subcarriers will typ-
ically experience correlated fading, in the present work
this effect is neglected as its impact on SKG has been
treated in numerous contributions in the past [71–73]
and will not enhance the problem formulation in the
following sections.
The SKG procedure encompasses three phases: ad-
vantage distillation, information reconciliation, and pri-
vacy amplification [14], [15] as described below:
1) Advantage distillation: This phase takes place
during the coherence time of the channel. The legiti-
mate nodes sequentially exchange constant probe sig-
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nals with power P on all subcarriers2, to obtain esti-
mates of their reciprocal CSI. We note in passing that
the pilot exchange phase can be made robust with re-
spect to injection type of attacks (that fall in the general
category of MiM) as analyzed in [22, 74]. Commonly,
the received signal strength (RSS) has been used as the
source of shared randomness for generating the shared
key, but it is possible to use the full CSI [75]. At the end
of this phase, Alice and Bob obtain observation vectors
xA = [xA,1, . . . , xA,N ],xB = [xB,1, . . . , xB,N ], respec-
tively, so that:
xA =
√
Ph+ zA, (1)
xB =
√
Ph+ zB, (2)
where zA and zB denote zero-mean, unit variance circu-
larly symmetric complex AWGN random vectors, such
that (zA, zB) ∼ CN (0, I2N ). On the other hand, Eve
observes xE = [xE,1, . . . , xE,N ] with:
xE =
√
PhE + zE . (3)
Due to the rich Rayleigh multipath environment, Eve’s
channel measurement hE is assumed uncorrelated to
h and zE denotes a zero-mean, unit variance circu-
larly symmetric complex AWGN random vector zE ∼
CN (0, IN ).
2) Information reconciliation: At the beginning of
this phase the observations xA,j , xB,j are quantized to
binary vectors3 rA,j , rB,j j = 1, . . . , N [76–78], so that
Alice and Bob distill rA = [rA,1|| . . . ||rA,N ] and rB =
[rB,1|| . . . ||rB,N ], respectively. Due to the presence of
noise, rA and rB will differ. To reconcile discrepancies
in the quantizer local outputs, side information needs to
be exchanged via a public channel. Using the principles
of Slepian Wolf decoding, the distilled binary vectors
can be expressed as
rA = d+ eA, (4)
rB = d+ eB, (5)
where eA, eB are error vectors that represent the dis-
tance from the common observed (codeword) vector d
at Alice and Bob, respectively.
Numerous practical information reconciliation ap-
proaches using standard forward error correction codes
(e.g., LDPC, BCH, etc.,) have been proposed [16], [75].
As an example, if a block encoder is used, then the
error vectors can be recovered from the syndromes sA
and sB of rA and rB, respectively. Alice transmits her
2 An explanation of the optimality of this choice under dif-
ferent attack scenarios is discussed in [22].
3 Note that each observation can generate a multi-bit vector
at the output of the quantizer.
corresponding syndrome to Bob so that he can rec-
oncile rB to rA. It has been shown that the length
of the the syndrome |sA| is lower bounded by |sA| ≥
H(xA|xB) = H(xA,xB) − H(xB) [15]. This has been
numerically evaluated for different scenarios and coding
techniques [77, 79–81]. Following that, the achievable
SKG rate is upper bounded by I(xA;xB|xE).
3) Privacy amplification: The secret key is gener-
ated by passing rA through a one-way collision resistant
compression function i.e., by hashing. Note that this
final step of privacy amplification, is executed locally
without any further information exchange. The need
for privacy amplification arises in order to suppress the
entropy revealed due to the public transmission of the
syndrome sA. Privacy amplification produces a key of
length strictly shorter than |rA|, at least by |sA|. At
the same time, the goal is for the key to be uniform,
i.e., to have maximum entropy. In brief, privacy ampli-
fication reduces the overall output entropy while at the
same time increases the entropy per bit – compared to
the input.
The privacy amplification is typically performed by
applying either cryptographic hash functions such as
those built using the Merkle-Damgard construction, or
universal hash functions and has been proven to be se-
cure, in an information theoretic sense, through the left-
over hash lemma [82]. As an example [40, 83] use a 2-
universal hash family to achieve privacy amplification.
Summarizing, the maximum key size after privacy am-
plification is:
|k| ≤ H(xA)− I(xA;xE)−H(xA|xB)− r0, (6)
where H(xA) represents the entropy of the measure-
ment, I(xA;xE) represents the mutual information be-
tween Alice’s and Eve’s observations, H(xA|xB) repre-
sents the entropy revealed during information reconcil-
iation and r0 > 0 is an extra security parameter that
ensures uncertainty on the key at Eve’s side. For de-
tails and estimation of these parameters in a practical
scenario please see [84].
As shown in this section the SKG procedure requires
only a few simple operations such as quantization, syn-
drome calculation and hashing. In future work we will
examine the real possibilities of implementing such a
mechanism in practical systems.
4.3 AE Using SKG
To develop a hybrid cryptosystem that can withstand
tampering attacks, SKG can be introduced in standard
AE schemes in conjunction with standard block ciphers
in counter mode (to reduce latency), e.g., AES GCM.
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As a sketch of such a primitive, let us assume a system
with three parties: Alice who wishes to transmit a secret
message m with size |m|, to Bob with confidentiality
and integrity, and Eve, that can act as a passive and
active attacker. The following algorithms are employed:
– The SKG scheme denoted by G : C → K × S, ac-
cepting as input the fading coefficients (modelled as
complex numbers), and generating as outputs bi-
nary vectors k and sA in the key and syndrome
spaces, of sizes |k| and |sA|, respectively,
G(h) = (k, sA) , (7)
where k ∈ K denotes the key obtained from h after
privacy amplification and sA is Alice’s syndrome.
– A symmetric encryption algorithm, e.g., AES GCM,
denoted by Es : K ×M → CT where CT denotes
the ciphertext space with corresponding decryption
Ds : K × CT →M, such that
Es(k,m) = c, (8)
Ds(k, c) =m, (9)
for m ∈ M, c ∈ CT .
– A pair of message authentication code (MAC) al-
gorithms, e.g., in HMAC mode, denoted by Sign :
K ×M → T , with a corresponding verification al-
gorithm Ver : K×M× T → (yes, no), such that
Sign(k,m) = t, (10)
Ver(k,m, t) =
{
yes , if integrity verified
no, if integrity not verified
(11)
A hybrid crypto-PLS system for AE SKG can be
built as follows:
1. The SKG procedure is launched between Alice and
Bob generating a key and a syndrome G(h)=(k, sA).
2. Alice breaks her key into two parts k = {ke,ki}
and uses the first to encrypt the message as c =
Es(ke,m). Subsequently, using the second part of
the key she signs the ciphertext using the signing
algorithm t = Sign(ki, c) and transmits to Bob the
extended ciphertext [sA‖c‖t], as it is depicted in Fig.
3.
3. Bob checks first the integrity of the received cipher-
text as follows: from sA and his own observation he
evaluates k = {ke,ki} and computes Ver(ki, c, t).
The integrity test will fail if any part of the ex-
tended ciphertext was modified, including the syn-
drome (that is sent as plaintext); for example, if
the syndrome was modified during the transmission,
then Bob would not have evaluated the correct key
and the integrity test would have failed.
4. If the integrity test is successful then Bob decrypts
m=Ds(ke, c).
4.4 Resumption Protocol
In Section 4.1 we discussed that using PUF authentica-
tion can greatly reduce the computational overhead of
a system. Authentication of new keys is required at the
start of communication and at each key renegotiation.
However, the number of challenges that can be applied
to a single PUF is limited. Due to that we present a
solution that is inspired by the 0-RTT authentication
mode introduced in the 1.3 version of the TLS [23]. The
use of 0-RTT obviates the need of performing a chal-
lenge for every re-authentication through the use of a
resumption secret rs, thus reducing latency. Another
strong motivation for using this mechanism is that it
is forward secure in the scenario we are using here [24].
We first briefly describe the TLS 0-RTT mechanism be-
fore describing a similarly inspired 0-RTT mechanism
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applied to the information reconciliation phase of our
SKG mechanism.
The TLS 1.3 0−RTT handshake works as follows:
In the very first connection between client and server
a regular TLS handshake is used. During this step the
server sends to the client a look-up identifier kl for a cor-
responding entry in session caches or it sends a session
ticket. Then both parties derive a resumption secret rs
using their shared key and the parameters of the ses-
sion. Finally, the client stores the resumption secret rs
and uses it when reconnecting to the same server which
also retrieves it during the re-connection.
If session tickets are used the server encrypts the
resumption secret using long-term symmetric encryp-
tion key, called a session ticket encryption key (STEK),
resulting in a session ticket. The session ticket is then
stored by the client and included in subsequent con-
nections, allowing the server to retrieve the resumption
secret. Using this approach the same STEK is used for
many sessions and clients. On one hand, this property
highly reduces the required storage of the server, how-
ever, on the other hand, it makes it vulnerable to replay
attacks and not forward secure. Due to these vulnera-
bilities, in this work we focus on the session cache mech-
anism described next.
When using session caches the server stores all re-
sumption secrets and issues a unique look-up identifier
kl for each client. When a client tries to reconnect to
that server it includes its look-up identifier kl in the
0-RTT message, which allows the server to retrieve the
resumption secret rs. Storing a unique resumption se-
cret rs for each client requires server storage for each
client but it provides forward security and resilience
against replay attacks, when combined with a key gen-
eration mechanisms such as Diffie Hellman (or the SKG
used in this paper) which are important goals for secu-
rity protocols [24]. In our physical layer 0-RTT, given
that a node identifier state would be required for link-
layer purposes, the session cache places little compara-
tive load and thus is the mechanism proposed here for
(re-)authentication.
The physical layer resumption protocol modifies the
information reconciliation phase of Section 3.1 follow-
ing initial authentication to provide a re-authentication
mechanism between Alice and Bob. At the first estab-
lishment of communication we assume initial authen-
tication is established, such as the mechanism shown
in Section 4.1. During that Alice sends to Bob a look-
up identifier kl. Then, both derive a resumption secret
rs that is identified by kl. Note, rs and the session key
have the same length |k|. Then referring to the notation
and steps in Section 4.1-4.3:
1. Advantage distillation phase is carried out as before
(See section 4.2), where both parties obtain channel
observations and obtain the vectors rA and rB.
2. During the information reconciliation phase both
Alice and Bob exclusive-or the resumption secret rs
with their observations rA and rB , obtaining syn-
dromes s′A and s
′
B with which both parties can carry
out reconciliation to obtain the same shared value
which is now rA ⊕ rs.
3. The privacy amplification step in Section 4.2 is car-
ried out as before, but now the hashing takes place
on rA⊕ rs to produce the final shared key k′ that is
a result of both the shared wireless randomness and
the resumption secret.
Note that the key k′ can only be obtained if both
the physical layer generated key and the resumption key
are valid and this method can be shown to be forward
secure [24].
5 Pipelined SKG and Encrypted Data Transfer
As explained in Section 4, if Alice and Bob follow the
standard sequential SKG process they can exchange en-
crypted data only after both of them have distilled the
key at the end of the privacy amplification step. In this
Section, we propose a method to pipeline the SKG and
encrypted data transfer. Alice can unilaterally extract
the secret key from her observation and use it to encrypt
data transmitted in the same “extended” message that
contains the side information (see Fig. 3). Subsequently,
using the side information, Bob can distill the same key
k and decrypt the received data in one single step.
We have discussed in Section 4.2 how Alice and Bob
can distill secret keys from estimates of the fading co-
efficients in their wireless link and in Section 4.3 how
these can be used to develop an AE SKG primitive. At
the same time CSI estimates are prerequisite in order
to optimally allocate power across the subcarriers and
achieve high data rates4. As a result, a question that
naturally arises is whether the CSI estimates (obtained
at the end of the pilot exchange phase), should be used
towards the generation of secret keys or towards the re-
liable data transfer, and, furthermore, whether the SKG
and the data transfer can be inter-woven using the AE
SKG principle.
In this paper, we are interested in answering this
question and shed light into whether following the ex-
change of pilots Alice should transmit reconciliation in-
formation on all subcarriers, so that she and Bob can
4 As an example, despite the extra overhead, in URLLC
systems advanced CSI estimation techniques are employed in
order to be able to satisfy the strict reliability requirements.
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generate (potentially) a long sequence of key bits, or,
alternatively, perform information reconciliation only
over a subset of the subcarriers and transmit encrypted
data over the rest, exploiting the idea of the AE SKG
primitive. Note here that the data can be already en-
crypted with the key generated at Alice, the sender of
the side information, so that the proposed pipelining
does not require storing keys for future use. We will
call the former approach a sequential scheme, while we
will refer to the latter as a parallel scheme. The two will
be compared in terms of their efficiency with respect to
the achievable data rates.
A simplified version of this problem, where the rec-
onciliation rate is roughly approximated to the SKG
rate, was investigated in [85]. In this study it was shown
that in order to maximize the data rates in the parallel
approach Alice and Bob should use the strongest sub-
carriers – in terms of SNR – for data transmission and
the worst for SKG. Under this simplified formulation,
the optimal power allocation for the data transfer has
been shown to be a modified waterfilling solution.
Here, we explicitly account for the rate of transmit-
ting reconciliation information and differentiate it from
the SKG rate. We confirm whether the policy of us-
ing the strongest subcarriers for data transmission and
not for reconciliation, is still optimal when the full opti-
mization problem is considered, including the commu-
nication cost for reconciliation.
As discussed in Section 4.2, our physical layer sys-
tem model assumes Alice and Bob exchange data over
a Rayleigh BF-AWGN channel with N orthogonal sub-
carriers. Without loss of generality the variance of the
AWGN in all links is assumed to be unity. During chan-
nel probing, constant pilots are sent across all subcar-
riers [16, 86] with power P . Using the observations (1),
Alice estimates the channel coefficients as
hˆj = hj + h˜j , (12)
for j = 1, . . . , N where h˜j denotes an estimation error
that can be assumed to be Gaussian, h˜j ∼ CN (0, σ2e)
[87]. Under this model, the following rate is achievable
on the j-th subcarrier from Alice to Bob when the trans-
mit power during data transmission is pj [87]:
Rj = log2
(
1 +
gjpj
σ2eP + 1
)
= log2(1 + gˆjpj), (13)
where we use gˆi =
gi
σ2i,eP+1
, to denote the estimated
channel gains. As a result, the channel capacity C =∑N
j=1Rj under the short term power constraint:
N∑
j=1
pj ≤ NP, pj ≥ 0, ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , N}, (14)
is achieved with the well known waterfilling power al-
location policy pj =
[
1
λ
− 1
gˆj
]+
, where the water-level
λ is estimated from the constraint (14). In the follow-
ing, the estimated channel gains gˆj are – without loss
of generality – assumed ordered in descending order, so
that:
gˆ1 ≥ gˆ2 ≥ . . . ≥ gˆN . (15)
As mentioned above, the advantage distillation phase
of the SKG process consists of the two-way exchange of
pilot signals during the coherence time of the channel to
obtain rA,j , rB,j , j = 1, . . . , N . On the other hand, the
CSI estimation phase can be used to estimate the recip-
rocal channel gains in order to optimize data transmis-
sion using the waterfilling algorithm. In the former case,
the shared parameter is used for generating symmetric
keys, in the latter for deriving the optimal power alloca-
tion. In the parallel approach the idea is to inter-weave
the two procedures and investigate whether a joint en-
crypted data transfer and key generation scheme as in
the AE SKG in Section 4.3 could bear any advantages
with respect to the system efficiency. While in the se-
quential approach the CSI across all subcarriers will be
treated as a source of shared randomness between Alice
and Bob, in the parallel approach it plays a dual role.
5.1 Parallel Approach
In the parallel approach, after the channel estimation
phase, the legitimate users decide on which subcarrier
to send the reconciliation information (e.g., the syn-
dromes as discussed in Section 4.2) and on which data
(i.e., the SKG process here is not performed on all of
the subcarriers). The total capacity has now to be dis-
tributed between data and reconciliation information
bearing subcarriers. As a result, the overall set of or-
thogonal subcarriers comprises two subsets; a subset
D that is used for encrypted data transmission with
cardinality |D| = D and a subset D˘ with cardinal-
ity |D˘| = N − D used for reconciliation such that,
D ∪ D˘ = {1, . . . , N}. Over D the achievable sum data
transfer rate, denoted by CD is given by
CD =
∑
j∈D
log2(1 + gˆjpj), (16)
while on the subset D˘, Alice and Bob exchange recon-
ciliation information at rate
CR =
∑
j∈D˘
log2(1 + gˆjpj). (17)
As stated in Section 4.2 the fading coefficients are as-
sumed to be zero-mean circularly-symmetric complex
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Gaussian random variables. Using the theory of order
statistics, the distribution of the ordered channel gains
of the SKG subcarriers, j ∈ D˘, can be expressed as [88]:
f(gj)=
N !
σ2(N − j)!(j − 1)!
(
1− e−
gˆj
σ2
)N−j(
e−
gˆj
σ2
)j
,
(18)
where σ2 is the variance of the channel gains. As a result
of ordering the subcarriers, the variance of each of the
subcarriers, is now given by:
σ2j = σ
2
N∑
q=j
1
q2
, j ∈ {D + 1, . . . , N}. (19)
Thus, we can now write the SKG rate as (note that the
noise variances are here normalized to unity for simplic-
ity) [16, 86]:
CSKG =
∑
j∈D˘
log2

1 + Pσ2j
2 + 1
Pσ2j

 . (20)
The minimum rate necessary for reconciliation was
discussed in Section 4.2. Here, alternatively, we employ
a practical design approach in which the rate of the en-
coder used is explicitly taken into account. Note that in
a rate k
n
block encoder the side information is n−k bits
long, i.e., the rate of syndrome to output key bits after
privacy amplification is n−k
k
. However, in each key ses-
sion a 0-RTT look-up identifier of length k is also sent.
Therefore, we define the parameter κ = n−k
k
+ 1 = n
k
,
i.e., the inverse of the encoder rate, that reflects the ra-
tio of the reconciliation and 0-RTT transmission rate to
the SKG rate. For example, for a rate k
n
= 12 encoder,
κ = 2, etc. Based on this discussion, we capture the min-
imum requirement for the reconciliation rate through
the following expression:
CR ≥ κCSKG. (21)
Furthermore, to identify the necessary key rate, we
note that depending on the exact choices of the crypto-
graphic suites to be employed, it is possible to reuse the
same key for the encryption of multiple blocks of data,
e.g., as in the AES GCM, that is being considered for
employment in the security protocols for URLLC sys-
tems [4]. In practical systems, a single key of length 128
to 256 bits can be used to encrypt up to gigabytes of
data. As a result, we will assume that for a particular
application it is possible to identify the ratio of key to
data bits, which in the following we will denote by β.
Specifically, we assume that the following security con-
straint should be met
CSKG ≥ βCD, 0 < β ≤ 1, (22)
where, depending on the application, the necessary min-
imum value of β can be identified. We note in passing
that the case β = 1 would correspond to a one-time-pad,
i.e., the generated keys could be simply x-ored with the
data to achieve perfect secrecy without the need of any
cryptographic suites.
Accounting for the reconciliation rate and security
constraints in (21) and (22) we formulate the following
maximization problem:
max
pj ,j∈D
∑
j∈D
Rj (23)
s.t. (14), (21), (22),∑
j∈D
Rj +
∑
j∈D˘
Rj ≤ C. (24)
(22) can be integrated with (21) to the combined con-
straint
∑
j∈D
Rj ≤
∑
j∈D˘
Rj
κβ
. (25)
The optimization problem at hand is a mixed-integer
convex optimization problem with unknowns both the
sets D, D˘, as well as the power allocation policy pj, j ∈
{1, . . . , N}. These problems are typically NP hard and
addressed with the use of branch and bound algorithms
and heuristics.
In this work, we propose a simple heuristic to make
the problem more tractable by reducing the number
of free variables. In the proposed approach, we assume
that the constraint (24) is satisfied with equality. The
only power allocation that allows this is the waterfilling
approach that uniquely determines the power allocation
pj and also requires that the constraint (14) is also sat-
isfied with equality. Thus, if we follow that approach,
we determine the power allocation vector uniquely and
can combine the remaining constraints (24) and (25)
into a single one as:∑
j∈D
Rj ≤ C
κβ + 1
. (26)
The new optimization problem can be re-written as
max
xj∈{0,1}
N∑
j=1
Rjxj (27)
s.t.
N∑
j=1
Rjxj ≤ C
1 + κβ
. (28)
The problem in (27)-(28) is a subset-sum problem from
the family of 0−1 knapsack problems, that is known to
be NP hard [89]. However, these type of problems are
solvable optimally using dynamic programming tech-
niques in pseudo-polynomial time [89,90]. Furthermore,
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Algorithm 1 Heuristic Greedy Algorithm for (27)-(28)
1: procedure Heuristic(start, end, Rj)
2: j ← 1, R0 ← 0, RN+1 ← 0
3: while j ≤ N − 1 and
∑
N
j=1
Rjxj ≤
C
1+κβ
do
4:
∑
N
j=1
Rjxj ←
∑
N
j=1
Rj−1xj−1 +Rjxj
5: if
∑
N
j=1
Rjxj ≤
C
1+κβ
then
6: xj ← 1; j ← j + 1
7: else do xj ← 0; j ← j + 1
8: end if
9: end while
10: end procedure
it is known that greedy heuristic approaches are bounded
away from the optimal solution by half [91].
We propose a simple greedy heuristic algorithm of
linear complexity, as follows.5 The data subcarriers are
selected starting from the best – in terms of SNR – until
(28) is not satisfied. Once this situation occurs the last
subcarrier added to set D is removed and the next one
is added. This continues either to the last index N or
until (28) is satisfied with equality. The algorithm is
described in Algorithm 1.
The efficiency of the proposed parallel method –
measured as the ratio of the long-term data rate ver-
sus the average capacity – is evaluated as:
ηparallel =
E
[ ∑
j∈D
Rj
]
E[C]
. (29)
This efficiency quantifies the expected back-off in terms
of data rates when part of the resources (power and fre-
quency) are used to enable the generation of secret keys
at the physical layer. In future work, we will compare
the efficiency achieved to that of actual approaches cur-
rently used in 5G by accounting for the actual delays
incurred due to the PKE key agreement operations [20].
5.2 Sequential Approach
In the sequential approach encrypted data transfer and
secret key generation are two separate events; first, the
secret keys are generated over the whole set of subcar-
riers, leading to a sum SKG rate given as
CSKG = N log2
(
1 +
Pσ2
2 + 1
Pσ2
)
. (30)
5 Without loss of generality, the algorithm assumes that
the channel gains are ordered in decreasing order as in (15),
and, consequently, the rates Rj are also ordered in descending
order. The ordering is a O(N logN) operation and required
in common power allocation schemes such as the waterfilling,
and, therefore does not come at any additional cost.
To estimate the efficiency of the scheme, we further need
to identify the necessary resources for the exchange of
the reconciliation information. We can obtain an esti-
mate of the number of transmission frames that will
be required for the transmission of the syndromes, as
the expected value of the reconciliation rate (i.e., it’s
long-term value) E[CR]. The average number of frames
needed for reconciliation is then computed as:
M =
⌈
κCSKG
E[CR]
⌉
, (31)
where ⌈x⌉ denotes the smallest integer that is larger
than x.
The average number of the frames that can be sent
while respecting the secrecy constraint is:
L =
⌊
CSKG
βE[C]
⌋
, (32)
where ⌊x⌋ denotes the largest interger that is smaller
than x. The efficiency of the sequential method is then
calculated as:
ηsequential =
L
L+M
. (33)
6 Effective Data Rate Taking into Account
Statistical Delay QoS Requirements
In the previous section, we investigated the optimal
power and subcarrier allocations strategy of Alice and
Bob in order to maximize their long-term average data
rate and proposed a greedy heuristic algorithm of lin-
ear complexity. Here, we extend our work from Section
5 by taking into account delay requirements. In detail,
we investigate the optimal resource allocation for Alice
and Bob, when their communication has to satisfy spe-
cific delay constraints. To this end, we use the theory of
effective capacity [28] which gives a limit for the max-
imum arrival rate under delay-bounds with a specified
violation probability.
We study the effective data rate for the proposed
pipelined SKG and encrypted data transfer scheme; the
effective rate is a data-link layer metric that captures
the impact of statistical delay QoS constraints on the
transmission rates. As background, we refer to [92] which
showed that the probability of a steady-state queue
length process Q(t) exceeding a certain queue-overflow
threshold x converges to a random variable Q(∞) as:
lim
x→∞
ln(Pr[Q(∞) > x])
x
= −θ, (34)
where θ indicates the asymptotic exponential decay-
rate of the overflow probability. For a large threshold
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x, (34) can be represented as Pr[Q(∞) > x] ≈ e−θx.
Furthermore, the delay-outage probability can be ap-
proximated by [28] :
Proutdelay=Pr[Delay>Dmax]≈Pr[Q(∞)>0]e−θζDmax , (35)
whereDmax is the maximum tolerable delay, Pr[Q(∞) >
0] is the probability of a non-empty buffer, which can be
estimated from the ratio of the constant arrival rate to
the averaged service rate, ζ is the upper bound for the
constant arrival rate when the statistical delay metrics
are satisfied.
Using the delay exponent (θ) and the probability of
non-empty buffer, the effective capacity, that denotes
the maximum arrival rate, can be formulated as [28]:
EC(θ) = − lim
t→∞
1
θ
lnE[e−θS[t]](bits/s), (36)
where S[t] =
∑t
i=1 s[i] denotes the time-accumulated
service process, and s[i], i = 1, 2, ... denotes the discrete-
time stationary and ergodic stochastic service process.
Therefore, the delay exponent θ indicates how strict the
delay requirements are, i.e., θ → 0 corresponds to looser
delay requirements, while θ →∞ implies exceptionally
stringent delay constraints. Assuming a Rayleigh block
fading system, with frame duration Tf and total band-
width B, we have s[i] = TfBR˜i, with R˜i representing
the instantaneous service rate achieved during the du-
ration of the ith frame. In the context of the investi-
gated data and reconciliation information transfer, R˜i,
is given by:
R˜i =
1
F
∑
i∈D
log2(1 + pigˆi), (37)
where F is the equivalent frame duration, i.e., the total
number of subcarriers used for data transmission, so
that for the parallel approach we have F = |D| while
for the sequential approach F = N(L+M)L−1.
Under this formulation and assuming that Ga¨rtner-
Ellis theorem [93,94] is satisfied, the effective data rate6
EC(θ) is given as:
EC,D(θ) = − 1
θTfB
ln
(
E
[
e−θTfBR˜i
])
. (38)
6 Since part of the transmission rate is used for reconcili-
ation information, and part for data transmission the terms
“effective syndrome rate” and “effective data rate” are intro-
duced instead of the term “effective capacity”, for rigour. We
note that we assume the information data and reconciliation
information are accumulated in separate independent buffers
within the transmitter.
We set α =
θTfB
ln(2) . By inserting (37) into (38) we get:
EC,D(θ)=− 1
ln(2)α
ln
(
E
[
e− ln(2)αF
−1
∑
i∈D log2(1+pi gˆi)
])
,
EC,D(θ)= − 1
α
log2
(
E
[∏
i∈D
(1 + pigˆi)
−αF−1
])
. (39)
Assuming i.i.d. channel gains, by using the distribu-
tive property of the mathematical expectation, (39) be-
comes [95]:
EC,D(θ)= − 1
α
log2
(∏
i∈D
E
[
(1 + pigˆi)
−αF−1
])
. (40)
We further manipulate by using the log-product rule to
obtain:
EC,D(θ) = − 1
α
∑
i∈D
log2
(
E
[
(1 + pigˆi)
−αF−1
])
. (41)
Similarly, the effective syndrome rate can be written
as:
EC ˘,D(θ) = −
1
α
∑
i∈D˘
log2
(
E
[
(1 + pigˆi)
−αF˘−1
])
, (42)
where the size of F˘ here is |N −D|.
Using that, we now reformulate the maximization
problem given in (23) by adding a delay constraint. The
reformulated problem can be expressed as follows:
max
pj ,j∈D
EC,D(θ), (43)
s.t. (14), (25),
EC,D(θ) + EC,D˘(θ) ≤ EoptC (θ), (44)
where EoptC (θ) represents the maximum achievable ef-
fective capacity for both key and data transmission for
a given value of θ over N subcarriers:
EoptC (θ)=max
pi,i=1,2,...N
{
− 1
α
log2
(
E
[
N∏
i=1
(1 + pigˆi)
−αN−1
])}
.
(45)
In the proposed approach, we assume that the con-
straint (44) is satisfied with equality. Given that, the
optimization problem in (43) can be evaluated as two
sub-optimization problems: i) finding the optimal long
term power allocation from (14) and (45); ii) finding
the optimal subcarrier allocation that satisfies (25). We
solve the first problem that gives the optimal power al-
location using convex optimization tools. Next, as in
Section 5 we use two methods to solve subcarrier allo-
cation problem, i.e., by formulating a subset-sum 0 – 1
knapsack optimization problem or through a variation
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Fig. 4 a) Efficiency comparison for N = 12, SNR=10 dB
and κ = 2.
Fig. 4 b) Efficiency comparison for N = 64, SNR=10 dB
and κ = 2.
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Fig. 5 Efficiency vs κ, for N = 24, SNR=10 dB.
of Algorithm 1. The efficiency of both methods is com-
pared numerically to the sequential method in Section
7.
Now, following the same steps as in (39)-(41) and
using the fact that maximizing EC(θ) is equivalent to
minimizing −EC(θ) (this is due to log(·) being a mono-
tonically increasing concave function for any θ > 0) we
formulate the following minimization problem:
min
pi,i=1,2,...N
N∑
i=1
(
E
[
(1 + pigˆi)
−αN−1
])
, (46)
s.t. (14).
where F = N in this case as the full set of subcarriers
is concerned. We form the Lagrangian function L as:
L =
(
E
[
(1 + pigˆi)
−αN−1
])
+ λ
(
N∑
i=1
pi −NP
)
. (47)
By differentiating (47) w.r.t. pi and setting the deriva-
tive equal to zero [96] we get:
∂L
∂pi
= λ− αgˆi
N
(gˆipi + 1)
− α
N
−1
= 0. (48)
Solving (48) gives the optimal power allocation policy:
p∗i =
1
g
N
α+N
0 gˆ
α
α+N
i
− 1
gˆi
, (49)
where g0 =
Nλ
α
is the cutoff value which can be found
from the power constraint. By inserting p∗i in EC(θ) we
obtain the expression for EoptC (θ):
EoptC (θ) = −
1
α
N∑
i=1
log2
(
E
[(
gˆi
g0
)− α
α+N
])
(50)
When θ → 0 the optimal power allocation is equivalent
to water-filling and when θ → ∞ the optimal power
allocation transforms to total channel inversion.
Now, fixing the power allocation as in (49) we can
easily find the optimal subcarrier allocation that satis-
fies (25). As in Section 5 to do that we first formulate a
subset-sum 0 – 1 knapsack optimization problem that
we solve using the standard dynamic programming ap-
proach. Furthermore we evaluate the performance of the
heuristic algorithm presented in Algorithm 1.
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Fig. 6 a) Size of set D for different SNR levels and σ2e when
N = 24.
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Fig. 6 b) Size of set D for different values of κ when N = 24.
7 Results and Discussion
In this Section we provide numerical evaluations of the
efficiency that can be achieved with the presented me-
thods (i.e., sequential and parallel) for different values
of the main parameters. With respect to the parallel
approach, we provide numerical results of the optimal
dynamic programming solution of the subset-sum 0− 1
knapsack problem, as well as of the greedy heuristic
approach presented in Algorithm 1. For the case of the
long term average data rate CD (16), we compare the
two methods through their efficiencies, i.e. ηsequential
and ηparallel given in (33) and (29), respectively. Next,
to compare the two methods in the case of effective data
rate we evaluate EC,D(θ) given in (41). For better il-
lustration of each case they are separated into different
subsections.
7.1 Numerical results for the case long term average
CD
Figures 4a and 4b show the efficiency of the methods
for N = 12, and N = 64, respectively, while κ = 2 and
P = 10. We note that the proposed heuristic algorithm
has a near-optimal performance (almost indistinguish-
able from the red curves achieved with dynamic pro-
gramming). Due to this fact (which was tested across
all scenarios that follow) only the heuristic approach is
shown in subsequent figures for clarity in the graphs.
We see that when there are a small number of sub-
carriers (N=12, typical for NB-IoT) and small β the ef-
ficiency of both the parallel ηparallel and the sequential
ηsequential approaches are very close to unity, a trend
that holds for increasing N . With increasing β, due
to the fact that more frames are needed for reconcil-
iation in the sequential approach (i.e., M increases),
regardless of the total number of subcarriers, the par-
allel method proves more efficient than the sequential.
While the efficiency of the sequential and parallel me-
thods coincide almost until around β = 0.01 forN = 12,
for N = 64 the crossing point of the curves moves to
the left and the efficiency of the two methods coincide
until around β = 0.001. This trend was found to be
consistent across many values of N , only two of which
are shown here for compactness of presentation.
Next, in Fig. 5 the efficiency of the parallel ηparallel
and the sequential ηsequential methods are shown for two
different values of κ ∈ {2, 3} for SNR = 10 dB and
N = 24. It is straightforward to see that they both
follow similar trends and when κ increases the efficiency
decreases. On the other hand, regardless of the value of
κ they both perform identically until around β = 0.001.
Finally, in Fig. 4, focusing on the parallel method,
the average size of set D is shown for different values of
σ2e and SNR levels (Fig. 6a) and κ (Fig. 6b), for N = 24.
As expected, in Fig. 6a we see when the SNR increases
the size of the set increases, too. This is due to the fact
that more power is used on any single subcarrier and
consequently a higher reconcilliation rate can be sus-
tained. Regarding the estimation error σ2e of the CSI, it
only slightly affects the performance at high SNR levels.
Hence more subcarriers have to be used for reconcilia-
tion, and fewer for data. The SNR level in Fig. 6b is set
to 10 dB. The figure shows that when increasing κ the
size of set D decreases. This result can be easily pre-
dicted from inequality (21), meaning, when κ increases
more reconciliation data has to be sent, hence fewer sub-
carriers can be used for data. In both Fig. 6a and Fig.
6b when β increases the size of set D decreases; this ef-
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fect is a consequence of constraint (28) as the data rate
is decreasing with β.
7.2 Numerical results for the case of effective data rate
Inspired by the good performance of Algorithm 1, in the
case where long-term average rate is the metric of inter-
est, here, we continue our investigation with a variation
of Algorithm 1, with the following differences: at lines
3 and 5 instead of (26) we use the constraint (25), the
power allocation is fixed as in (49). The performance of
our system is again compared with a sequential method
and the metric of interest here is the effective data rate.
The comparison is performed by taking into account
the following parameters: signal to noise ration (SNR);
number of subcarriers N ; ratio of the reconciliation and
0−RTT transmission rate to the SKG rate κ; delay ex-
ponent θ; and, the ratio of key bits to data bits β.
In Fig. 7 we give a three-dimensional plot show-
ing the dependence of the achievable effective data rate
EC,D(θ) on β and θ. Figures 7a and 7b compare the
parallel heuristic approach and the sequential approach
for high SNR levels, whereas Fig. 7c and 7d compare
their performance for low SNR level. In Fig. 7a and 7c
we have N = 12 while in Fig. 7b and 7d the total num-
ber of subcarriers is N = 64. All graphs compare the
performance of the heuristic parallel approach and the
sequential approach for κ = 2.
As discussed in Section 6, when the delay exponent θ
increases, the optimal power allocation transforms from
waterfilling to total channel inversion. Consequently,
the rate achieved on all subcarriers converges to the
same value, hence when we a have small number of sub-
carriers (such as N = 12) and small values of β then
using a single subcarrier for reconciliation data will use
more capacity than needed and most of the rate on this
subcarrier is wasted. Devoting a whole subcarrier for
sending the reconciliation data for the case of N = 12
and β = 0.0001 is almost equivalent of losing 1/12 of
the achievable rate.
This can be seen for in Fig. 7a and 7c. When the
SNR is high (See Fig. 7a), as discussed, this effect is
mostly noticeable for large values of θ and small values
of β7, whereas for small values of β and θ both algo-
rithms perform nearly identically. A similar trend can
be seen at the low SNR regime in Fig. 7c. However,
at a low SNR the sequential approach has a lower ef-
fective data rate. This happens because at high SNR
levels each reconciliation frame will contain more infor-
mation and hence more data frames will follow. There-
7 i.e that the ratio of reconciliation information to data is
small as seen from Eq. (25))
fore, at the low SNR regime, the reconciliation informa-
tion received will decrease, hence less data can be sent
afterwards. This does not affect the parallel approach.
However, in both scenarios high SNR Fig. 7a and low
SNR Fig. 7c, when β increases regardless of the value of
θ the parallel approach always achieves higher effective
data rate EC,D(θ).
In the next case, when the total number of subcarri-
ers is N = 64, illustrated in Fig. 7b and 7d, we see that
the penalty of devoting a high part of the achievable ef-
fective capacityEoptC (θ) to reconciliation disappears and
the heuristic parallel approach always achieves higher or
identical effective data rate EC,D(θ) compared to the se-
quential approach. This trend repeats for high and low
SNR levels as given in Fig. 7b and 7d, respectively.
Now, we take a closer look and transform some spe-
cific cases from the 3d plots to two-dimensional graphs.
In Fig. 8 we see the achieved effective data rate EC,D(θ)
given in (41), for different values of N and θ while the
SNR=5 dB and κ = 2. Fig. 8a gives the achieved effec-
tive rate on set D for N = 12 and θ = 0.0001 (relaxed
delay constraint). Similarly to the case of long term
average value of CD we see that for small values of β
the sequential approach achieves slightly higher effec-
tive data rate. As before, the increase of β results in
more reconciliation frames M required in the sequen-
tial case. This effect is not seen in the parallel case and
for high values of β it performs better.
Fig. 8b illustrates the case whenN = 12 and θ = 100
(very stringent delay constraint). Similarly as in Fig. 7,
we can see that for small values of β the sequential ap-
proach performs better than the parallel. As discussed,
the efficiency loss is caused by the fact that the devoted
part of the total achievable effective capacity EoptC (θ) to
reconciliation (syndrome communication) is more than
what is required. However, a higher β leads to an in-
crease in the reconciliation information that needs to
be sent, and the rate of the subcarriers in set D˘ will be
fully or almost fully utilised and the parallel approach
shows better performance for these values.
In the next two Fig.: 8c and 8d we show the perfor-
mance of the two algorithms for higher value of N = 64.
It is easy to see that regardless of the value of θ and β
both algorithms perform identical or the parallel is bet-
ter. In the previous case of N = 12 increasing θ might
reduce the effectiveness of the parallel approach, how-
ever when N = 64 increasing θ does not incur such a
penalty and the parallel is either identical to the se-
quential or outperforms it.
Another interesting fact from Fig. 8 is that looking
at the parallel approach, it can easily be seen that in all
cases the heuristic approach almost always performs as
well as the optimal knapsack solution. The case of small
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Fig. 7 a) Effective data rate achieved by the parallel heuris-
tic approach and the sequential approach when N = 12,
SNR= 10 dB and κ = 2.
Fig. 7 b) Effective data rate achieved by the parallel heuris-
tic approach and the sequential approach when N = 64,
SNR= 10 dB and κ = 2.
Fig. 7 c) Effective data rate achieved by the parallel heuris-
tic approach and the sequential approach when N = 12,
SNR= 0.2 dB and κ = 2.
Fig. 7 d) Effective data rate achieved by the parallel heuris-
tic approach and the sequential approach when N = 64,
SNR= 0.2 dB and κ = 2.
values of θ is similar to the one when we work with long
term average rate and choosing the best subcarriers for
data transmission works as well as the optimal Knap-
sack solution. Interestingly, Algorithm 1 works well for
high values of θ, too. This can be explained by the fact
that when θ increases the rate on all of the subcarriers
becomes similar and switching the subcarriers in set D
does not incur high penalty.
8 Conclusions
In this work we discussed the possibility of using SKG
in conjunction with PUF authentication protocols, illus-
trating this can greatly reduce the authentication and
key generation latency compared to traditional mech-
anisms. Furthermore, we presented an AE scheme us-
ing SKG and a resumption protocol which further con-
tribute to the system’s security and latency reduction,
respectively.
In addition, we explored the possibility of pipelin-
ing encrypted data transfer and SKG in a Rayleigh BF-
AWGN environment. We investigated the maximization
of the data transfer rate in parallel to performing SKG.
We took into account imperfect CSI measurements and
the effect of order statistics on the channel variance.
Two scenarios were differentiated in our study: i) the
optimal data transfer rate was found under power and
security constraints, represented by the system param-
eters β and κ, which represent the minimum ratio of
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Fig. 8 a) Effective data rate achieved by parallel and sequen-
tial approaches when N = 12, SNR= 5dB, θ = 0.0001, κ = 2.
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Fig. 8 b) Effective data rate achieved by parallel and sequen-
tial approaches when N = 12, SNR= 5dB, θ = 100, κ = 2.
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Fig. 8 c) Effective data rate achieved by parallel and sequen-
tial approaches when N = 64, SNR= 5dB, θ = 0.0001, κ = 2.
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Fig. 8 d) Effective data rate achieved by parallel and sequen-
tial approaches when N = 64, SNR= 5dB, θ = 100, κ = 2.
SKG rate to data rate and the maximum ratio of SKG
rate to reconciliation rate; ii) by adding a delay con-
straint, represented by parameter θ, to the security and
power constraint we found the optimal effective data
rate.
To finalise our study we illustrated through numer-
ical comparisons the efficiency of the proposed paral-
lel method, in which SKG and data transfer are inter-
weaved to a sequential method where the two operations
are done separately. The results of the two scenarios
showed that in most of the cases the performance of
both methods, parallel and sequential, is either equal
or the parallel performs better. As the possible advan-
tage of using the sequential is small and only applies in
particular scenarios, we recommend the parallel scheme
as a universal mechanism for general protocol design,
when latency is an issue. Furthermore, a significant re-
sult is that although the optimal subcarrier scheduling
is an NP hard 0− 1 knapsack problem, it can be solved
in linear time using a simple heuristic algorithm with
virtually no loss in performance.
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